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ABSTRACT 
Most nuclear power plants have extensive sets of Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe 
Accident Management Guidelines. These offer protection for a large series of events, both inside and 
outside the licensed design basis of the plant. For Extreme Events, which are characterised by a large 
destruction on-site and may include loss of command and control, damage to multiple units on-site, 
loss of communication both on-site and to off-site centres, staff members wounded or killed, such 
protection may not be enough. Examples of Extreme Events are air plane crash, site flooding, large 
earthquake plus possible tsunamis, etc. This paper describes what additional procedures, guidelines, 
hardware and organisational issues are needed to protect a site against such events. It is based on 
lessons learned from large destructive events in the past, such as the 9/11 attacks in the USA in 2001 
and the tsunami at the Fukushima-Daiichi plants in 2011. 
Keywords: Extreme Events, Accident Management, Procedures and Guidelines 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power plants have been designed to withstand a large series of Postulated Initiating 
Events (PIEs), up to and including Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), plus a number of events outside 
this range, so-called Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs), in the new IAEA terminology called 
Design Extension Conditions (DECs). Examples of BDBAs/DECs are: Anticipated Transient 
Without Scram (ATWS)1, station blackout (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS). The design 
offers a demonstrated protection if any of the DBAs or selected BDBAs/DECs happen, by the use of 
various safety and non-safety systems with application of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), 
and it offers methods to mitigate the consequences if the EOPs are not effective and fuel damage must 
be expected. These latter methods make use of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG).  
The set of EOPs and SAMG is designed on the basis of scenarios, often with the help of the 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). They are, however, shaped in such a way that it is not necessary 
for the operator to recognise the underlying scenario. Actions are taken on the basis of observed 
parameters to bring the plant in a safe stable state or, if this is not possible, to mitigate possible 
releases, irrespective of the accident scenario. 
Typically for SAMG is that the instructions need not be followed verbatim, as the evolution of 
the accident may be different from anticipated analysis, also due to deviating instrument behaviour, 
and to give the accident management team the opportunity to respond to events as they occur with 
the tools they have available, or can be assumed to be restored to service in due time.  Newer designs 
have features that are specifically designed to mitigate core damage scenarios, such as systems to 
cool a reactor pressure vessel from outside or, alternatively, a core catcher. 
The typical lesson from Fukushima is, however, that events can happen that have not been 
foreseen and are, therefore, outside the events for which the design offers protection through 
                                                 
1 These are events which would lead to an automatic reactor scram, but where the scram functions fails. 




hardware, procedures/guidelines (EOPs, SAMG) or both. Such events may be called ´Extreme 
Events` (EEs), or ´Site Disruptive Accidents` (SDAs). They may include a large destruction on-site, 
multiple failures of protective equipment, simultaneous damage to multiple stations on-site, staff 
members being wounded or killed, loss of normal command and control (i.e., loss of control room 
and emergency control room / shutdown room, possibly staff being wounded or killed; see further 
sec. 2.1), loss of communication systems, etc. 
External initiators of Extreme Events can be e.g., air plane crashes, large explosions, big fires, 
earthquakes, flooding, and destruction caused by third parties. Internal initiators can be reactor vessel 
failure, widespread fire from internal cause, large scale flooding from internal cause. Not extreme but 
complicated are multiple steam generator failures. 
 Unfortunately, we must assume that events which are (far) outside the design basis will 
continue to happen, as unforeseen events will continue to happen and no technology is perfect. Also 
operational errors have been made and will continue to be made in future. Therefore, efforts should 
be taken to mitigate such events to the extent practical with appropriate procedures and guidelines 
and, where needed, with additional equipment. This document gives an overview of such a set, and 
indicates where improvements should be made to present-day approaches. 
 
2 MAIN ELEMENTS TO MITIGATE EXTREME EVENTS/SITE DISRUPTIVE 
ACCIDENTS 
For Extreme Events/Site Disruptive Accidents it must be assumed that a precise prediction of 
actual damage states is not possible. Hence, bounding damage states have little value and a flexible 
response is desirable, including the use of portable equipment. Additional pre-fixed hardware may 
have limited value, as it can be damaged by the same event that caused damage to existing hardware. 
As stated, the damage can include loss of command and control, and it is a first priority to restore a 
commanding structure, [1]. 
 
2.1 Restoring Command and Control 
One of the potential consequences of an EE/SDA is the loss of command and control. This can 
happen through loss of the control room and the emergency control/shutdown room, either by 
physical damage, intrusion by third parties, loss of control room staff, or a combination of these. 
Physical damage can be caused by e.g., an air plane crash, a large fire and/or explosion, a big 
earthquake, site flooding, etc. Intrusion by third parties can include violent actions and may result in 
inability to access parts of the site. Loss of control room staff may be the consequences of such events, 
but also internal events may cause this, e.g., if main steam lines run close to the control room and 
rupture2. Hence, the very first action must be to restore command and control, so that a functioning 
Emergency Response Organisation (ERO) can be (re)created and response can be organised in a 
structured way. 
Restoring command and control should be done in an organised way. For example, it may call 
for surviving staff to assemble at some pre-defined location and restore a command and control 
structure with the ´best` people who are available, e.g., a senior reactor operator (SRO) as the 
preliminary leader of the ERO, until a more qualified person is able to take over command, e.g., a 
person designated and trained for the function of Emergency Director (which could also be an SRO). 
If not a sufficient number of such people are available, then an ERO may be established on the 
site by the help of a neighbouring NPP or another crisis organisation3. If the plant-ERO room is not 
available, the ERO may assemble in an alternate ERO/TSC facility, possibly off-site, as is often 
provided for an SDA (TSC = Technical Support Centre). 
                                                 
2 In some plants, steam lines run over the control room but there is no protection of the control room against a 
steam line rupture. 
3 In some countries, there is a national crisis organisation for such tasks (e.g., in France) 




Note that it may happen that the re-established ERO - at least initially - may not contain 
qualified reactor operators. Hence, the initial actions to stabilise the plant are separate from the 
ordinary EOPs and SAMG. 
 
2.2 Actions to stabilise the plant by the ERO and subsequent actions 
After re-establishing command and control or directly, if command and control have not been 
lost, the ERO takes a number of actions, which may - or may not - be in the following sequence 
(priorities may change due to circumstances): 
1. to re-establish communication on- and off-site (if it had been lost), 
2. to regain control over the site (if it had been lost), 
3. to limit site damage (e.g., fire fighting),  
4. to take care of wounded people, 
5. to check the condition of the key structures, systems and components, i.e., the reactor, the spent 
fuel pool, the core and spent fuel pool cooling systems, and the containment, and the conditions 
in areas where local actions must be executed, 
6. to initiate actions to stabilise the plant and to fulfil the main safety functions of shutting down, 
cooling the fuel (core and spent fuel), providing containment and mitigating any releases, 
7. to check the necessary support systems (AC power, DC power, water, pneumatic air, diesel 
fuel), and necessary staff, 
8. to continue the initial actions by initiating the appropriate emergency procedures and 
guidelines, i.e., Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), EOPs, SAMG, Technical Support 
Guidelines, as well as their long-term support functions, where applicable, 
9. to initiate necessary logistics such as food and lodging for personnel, changes of shift, contact 
of site personnel with their families, and  
10. to execute the site Emergency Plan. 
These tasks are further detailed as follows: 
Ad 1: To re-establish communication on- and off-site. 
For the case normal communication on- and off-site is lost, it may be useful to have dedicated 
battery-powered portable phones on dedicated locations, which can be assumed to remain unaffected 
by a site disruptive event. These can be used to re-establish the communications on- and off-site and 
to alert off-site emergency services, as is described in the plant emergency plan. They include police, 
medical support, fire brigades, etc., Battery power should last long enough that replacement batteries 
can be supplied. 
Ad 2: To regain control over the site (if it had been lost), and Ad 4: To take care of wounded 
people. 
If the accident involves a violent action by third parties, the ERO must make sure that safe 
access to all vital areas of the plant will be regained. It is assumed that this task is in the hands of the 
local security personnel. This action is not discussed here in further detail, as it is in the security 
domain of the plants. In addition, the ERO must take measures to take care of the wounded and 
arrange that medical assistance is provided for those in need. 
Ad 3: To limit site damage (e.g., fire fighting). 
The ERO should estimate the damage at the site and initiate measures to limit such damage. 
Priority may be successively with the auxiliary/fuel building, control building and turbine building. 
Measures may include containing and extinguishing fires, evacuating personnel in danger, making 
sure sufficient water is available. If the threat is from flooding or fire, personnel should be protected, 
and damage to power sources should be limited / mitigated. Hazardous material should be secured in 
agreement with applicable plant procedures. Note: if there is a conflict between nuclear safety (core/ 
spent fuel cooling) and fighting a fire in the turbine building, then nuclear safety has the priority. 
 Ad 5: To check the condition of the key structures, systems and components, i.e., the reactor, 
the spent fuel pool, core and pool cooling systems, and the containment and  




Ad 6: To initiate actions to stabilise the plant and to fulfil the main safety functions of 
shutting down, cooling the fuel (core and spent fuel), providing containment and mitigating any 
releases. 
The ERO should initiate actions to stabilise the plant. These are shutdown of the reactor and 
starting decay heat removal functions. Actions may be done locally/manually, according to pre-
established procedures. For example, for a PWR this includes starting the Turbine Driven Auxiliary 
FeedWater pump (TDAFW) locally and manually, for a BWR starting the Reactor Core Isolation 
Coolant system (RCIC) locally and manually. This may include the need for emergency lightning, 
dosimeters, protective clothing, ladders, and other equipment. In addition, a number of other actions 
are needed, as will be described in the next section. 
In a number of these guidelines support by portable equipment may be needed. This equipment 
should be stored on a safe part of the site (i.e., where it can be assumed that it is not made inoperable 
by the event).  
As it is not a priori clear that sufficient licensed operators are available to execute these actions, 
other staff members and, possibly, staff from off-site organisations (e.g., fire brigade staff, who have 
been trained in the procedures) are authorised to execute the actions. The procedures and guidelines 
need therefore be written in a style and format which makes the actions executable by such personnel. 
Note: the use of portable equipment includes transporting it to the plant and hooking it on to the 
connection points. These actions may require quite some additional staff, which should be considered 
in the ERO. 
The ERO should monitor and mitigate releases and make sure working areas are habitable. 
Where needed, doses should be estimated. If needed, sprays can be used to scrub fission products. 
The ERO should make sure spent fuel is and remains submerged or, if submergence is impossible, to 
keep it under spray cooling. 
The actions mentioned here and under Ad 7 are often called ´Extensive Damage Mitigation 
Guidelines (EDMG)`, which are further described in sec. 2.3. 
Ad 7: To check the necessary support systems (AC power, DC power, water, pneumatic air, 
diesel fuel), and necessary staff. 
The ERO should establish the needed resources for the various actions. This may include AC 
power, DC power, air (pneumatic devices), and fuel for diesels. Load shedding may be one strategy 
to extend battery life. Diesels may be started manually and, if no cooling is available, run with 
intervals. One should fill necessary water tanks e.g., by the fire extinguishing system. Apart from the 
hardware provisions, the ERO should assure that sufficient staff is available during all these actions 
and, if necessary, for prolonged time, i.e., until off-site support is available or on-site resources have 
been restored. Note: these actions presumably go together with Ad 6, and may even be of higher 
priority. 
Ad 8: To continue the initial actions by initiating the appropriate emergency procedures and 
guidelines, i.e., AOPs, EOPs, SAMG, Technical Support Guidelines, as well as their long-term 
support functions, where applicable. 
Once the initial actions to stabilise the plant have been completed – which may have been 
executed by non-licensed personnel – the normal set of procedures, i.e., AOPs, EOPs, SAMG – 
should be executed by licensed personnel, with the help of the Technical Support Centre. This 
depends on the fact whether the initial conditions for these procedures / guidelines have been reached, 
as may be determined from their logic diagrams. Note that these initial conditions may be different 
from the initial actions to stabilise the plant, as described under Ad 5.  
A number of these procedures / guidelines may call for portable equipment. This should be 
available and its transport, connection to the plant and its operation should be covered in the 
procedures / guidelines. This is further described in sec. 2.4. 
Ad 9: To initiate necessary logistics such as food and lodging for personnel, changes of shift, 
contact of site personnel with their families. 
As a site disruptive accident is a long-term event and may include major damage also off-site 
(e.g., caused by a major earthquake), it is necessary to take actions for long term accommodation of 




needed staff on-site. In addition, these people should have the possibility to communicate with their 
families, as there may be severe consequences also for their relatives. Staff not needed for the accident 
mitigation should be sent away, so as to minimise the burden on the ERO and on these people 
themselves. 
Ad 10: To Execute the Site Emergency Plan. 
The ERO should initiate the site Emergency Plan, which includes radiological assessments. 
Actions may include evacuation of relevant rooms, including the main control room and the TSC 
room, and then should make alternate places available from where the plant staff can execute its 
duties. The Emergency Plan includes also initial protective actions for people off-site, such as 
sheltering, distribution of iodine pills or evacuation, until the off-site emergency organisation can 
take over. If releases are high, this action may have a high priority. 
The entire tasks to be performed are displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Tasks in a Site Disruptive Accident (derived from [2]) 
 
2.3 Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) 
The actions mentioned under items 6 and 7 of sec. 2.2 include mainly manual/local actions 
using, where needed, mobile/portable equipment. They intend to preserve major safety functions and 
do so by the associated mitigation strategies, see Table 1 (largely derived from [1]).  
Whatever system is available to provide cooling water is used. This will also be the fire water 
system, if still available, or use of a portable pump, stored elsewhere on the site.  
Water may come from any source, including the sea. [1] describes various portable/mobile 
hardware to fulfil these functions. It is usually stored away from the plant, so that there is ample 
chance it will survive the damaging event. Sec. 2.4 describes such hardware in more detail. 
The EDMG which fulfil these functions are typically 10 – 30 guidelines for a plant. In the US, 
all guidelines are plant specific, as there are no generic guidelines, such as for EOPs and SAMG. 
 
Table 1 Basic Functions and Mitigation Strategies in a Site Disruptive Accident (largely from [1]) 
Safety Functions: 
BWR Safety Functions PWR Safety Functions 
Reactor Pressure Vessel level control Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
inventory control 
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat removal RCS heat removal 
Containment isolation Containment isolation 
Containment integrity Containment integrity 




Release mitigation Release mitigation 
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) 
Mitigation Strategies: 
BWR Mitigation Strategies PWR Mitigation Strategies 
Manual operation of Reactor Core Isolation Cool-
ant (RCIC) system or Isolation Condenser (IC) 
Makeup to Reactor Water Storage 
Tank (RWST) 
DC power supplies to allow depressurisation of RPV 
& injection with portable pump 
Manually depressurize Steam 
Generators (SGs) to reduce 
inventory loss 
Utilise feed water and condensate Manual operation of turbine (or 
diesel-) driven Auxiliary Feed water 
(AFW) pump 
Make up to hot well Manually depressurise SGs and use 
portable pump to feed 
Make up to Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Make up to CST or alternate feed 
source 
Procedure to isolate the Reactor Water 
Clean-Up (RWCU) 
 
Manually open containment vent lines  
Inject water into the drywell  
Portable sprays Portable sprays 
Internal make-up of SFP Internal make-up of SFP 
External make-up and spray of SFP External make-up of SFP 
 
2.4 Portable/Mobile Equipment and its use to strengthen Accident Management 
Many countries now have decided to have portable equipment available for added capability. 
As an example in the US, this is called FLEX, which stands for ´flexible and diverse response`. 
Canada uses a similar term: Emergency Management Equipment (EME). The US industry has set up 
an approach, documented in NEI 12-06 [3]. It basically consists of three steps: 
 Make sure best use is made of existing in-plant equipment, where needed strengthened. 
 Have portable equipment on-site, plus ways to transport and connect it to the plant. 
 Have portable equipment available off-site, plus a transport means - usually by air - to the 
stricken site and ways to connect it to the plant; this includes off-site organisational matters. 
Other countries have similar or equivalent approaches. But in some countries preference is 
given to installed and specially protected - often bunkered - hardware such as a diesel generator and/or 
deep well pumps, despite the risk that this hardware may also be damaged by the event. Portable 
equipment is then available temporarily, until the new equipment has been installed. In principle, 
such equipment is available in redundancy and stored separately, so that a single event cannot knock 
out both stocks of equipment. 
The approach assumes that command and control is normally available or has been restored and 
licensed staff is available to execute emergency procedures / guidelines. Therefore, this portable 
equipment is meant to add on EOPs with a focus on mitigating Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) 
and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS). Its main function is, hence, preventive, and for selected 
accidents (ELAP and LUHS). But the portable equipment may also be used for SAMG. Note that it 
(usually) is not designed to support SAMG. It can of course also contribute to the EDMG. 
Figure 2 is an example (from ´FLEX`, [3]) of an overview of the total assembly of procedures 
and guidelines for plant control. They correspond to the columns ´Plant Status` and ´Resources` in 
Figure 1. Note: ´broken lines` means that a formal connection between the associated blocks has not 
yet been established. 
 





Figure 2: Role and Place of FLEX and EDMG in Assembly of Procedures / Guidelines (from [3]) - 
GOPs are General Operating Procedures, ARPs are Alarm Response Procedures 
Use of portable/ bunkered equipment needs additional procedures/guidelines, such as in the 
USA the FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG). FLEX equipment or its equivalent usually includes mobile 
diesel generators, portable pumps, hoses, portable batteries, portable lightning, compressed air 
bottles, back-up water sources, organised access to alternate water sources (e.g., fire trucks), etc. The 
equipment should be stored in a place sufficiently protected against external events. Factors to be 
considered are the following:4 
 Use of installed equipment as long as is possible, such as the presence of a load shedding 
program, which sheds loads from all non-essential users. 
 Needed portable lighting and communications systems necessary for ingress and egress to 
plant areas required for deployment of portable equipment. 
 Access to areas where local actions must be performed, also under the extended loss of AC, 
considering also areas locked in absence of AC. 
 Effect of loss of ventilation on safety relevant equipment and on access to relevant rooms. 
 Operation of containment isolation valves also under the absence of AC/DC. 
 Powering igniters for mitigating hydrogen combustion risks. 
 Powering relevant instrumentation by portable batteries. 
 A sufficient quantity of portable equipment to serve all units on a site simultaneously. 
 Possibility to power up local consumers if the plant internal power distribution (LIPD) does 
not function (requires sufficient number and length of cables and appropriate cable 
connections). 
 
Portable equipment should be designed appropriately, taking note of needed pump head, head 
loss in long lines (hoses), back pressure of pressurised volumes (e.g., steam generator), prevention of 
clogging of inlet lines by debris, ice (winter), etc., taking into account the effect of the external event 
on the alternate water sources. 
The procedures /guidelines to hook on portable equipment should include consideration of 
difficulty and time involved in its transport to the connection points. 
It should be noted that portable equipment may also be needed if the event occurs during an 
outage. Hence, access routes to transport such equipment and places to hook it on should remain 
available in an outage. Special attention should be paid to equipment of contractors - of which there 
are usually many during an outage, plus their equipment - that it does not block routes needed to 
transport emergency equipment. 
Another way to give the structure of plant procedures and guidelines is presented in Figure 3 
(derived from [2]). 
                                                 
4 Largely taken from NEI 12-06, [3] 





2.5 Off-site Support 
Support from off-site resources requires an appropriate off-site organisation to meet all 
requirements from the stricken site. This includes provision of equipment and its spare parts and 
maintenance, consumables, replacement staff, communication means, transport means (trucks, 
helicopters), personal provisions (food, lodging, medical needs). It should be noted that it will take 
time before the off-site support is fully available and functional, possibly a whole day. Provisions on-
site should be such that this anticipated time lap is appropriately covered: 
• The stored equipment must meet appropriate specifications (not necessarily nuclear safety 
qualifications), have maintenance and regular tests and inspections. Where equipment is out of 
service for longer times, alternative equipment should be available. 
• Transport to the site should not depend on a single transport means or way. 
• Plant modifications should be followed and lead to adaptation of equipment or its means of 
connection to the plant, where needed. 
• The off-site organisation should be regularly tested to maintain a high level of alertness and 
capability to support the stricken plant or site. 
• If a multi-unit site is served, it should contain sufficient means to support all units on the site at 
the same time. 
 
 
Figure 3: Assembly of Plant Procedures and Guidelines to mitigate Large Scale Events and 
Accidents; (double arrow: increasing severity; single arrow: information and authority flow). 
Teams are available in the US Regional Response Centres to execute these actions.  In France 
there is a Nuclear Rapid Action Force ´FARN` for this purpose. 
 
3 HUMAN ASPECTS OF ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT5 
Decision making or the preparation of decision making in the Technical Support Centre can be 
a group decision making process. Groups may act differently from individuals. Group decision 
making has advantages in that a group may collectively have more knowledge than an individual. As 
there is deliberation and argumentation, including pros and cons of possible decisions, the final result 
may be more balanced and better founded. The probability of errors may be smaller as is the chance 
to overlook important information. 
 The downside is that group decision making generally, will take more time, and probably is 
more cautious, due to the long deliberation process. However, groups can also take more risky 
decisions, because the weight of the decision making is diluted. Due to this dilution, individuals may 
                                                 
5 This section is drawn from [4] 




act differently if placed as an individual for making a decision than as member of a group. The 
individual contributions may also have different weight, as some people tend to place themselves in 
the foreground, being ´informal leaders`, whereas others may tend to be more ´followers`. This may 
also result in a decision process where some are ́ winners´ (their arguments have prevailed) and others 
are ´losers` (their arguments did not prevail). 
Consequently, groups can either be more cautious, i.e., trying to avoid risks in decision making, 
or more courageous, i.e., prepared to take risks in decision making. An example is the need to 
depressurise the primary system in one of the severe accident guidelines, to avoid high pressure melt 
ejection. However, the TSC may observe that there is a chance that a lost diesel will be back on line 
in some hours and so injection into the RCS may be restored, which will prevent vessel failure and 
all its consequences. Here a cautious TSC will depressurise (the default case), and a courageous TSC 
will not. The outcome, of course, is only known after the accident evolution is complete. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be not much research with respect to the human aspects of 
decision making in a severe reactor accident, neither application of the extensive work on decision 
making processes in other disciplines6. A recent study in this respect is documented in [6]. Human 
engineering aspects of nuclear safety are further considered in [7]. 
 
4 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
Another and important aspect is that the accident management described is of the so-called 
routine type: ´Routine Accident Management`, i.e., the accident evolves more or less according to 
scenarios previously analysed. This still can be a large accident, with much damage and the need for 
large-scale support. But as tasks are well defined and procedures are valid and applicable, accident 
management can be expected to be effective. An example is a large traffic accident, with big damage 
and many victims, but the public services (police, fire brigade, medical teams) are trained for such 
accidents and will know what to do. 
However, it can also happen than the accident does not evolve along pre-analysed scenarios or 
does not result in pre-analysed plant damage conditions, and then many of the procedures and 
guidelines developed for those scenarios and/or conditions are not effective. In that case, 
improvisation is needed, with deviations from pre-designed countermeasures. Such accident 
management is described as `Emergency Accident Management`. It requires a different type of 
organisation and its success depends also on strong leadership with the decision maker(s). For 
example, evaluation and decision making are more of cognitive nature than of rule-based nature and, 
hence, require more knowledge and training. More information is in [5]. It has been argued that the 
success at Fukushima-Daini was, at least in part, due to this other type of accident management. 
Training should, therefore, include this type of training to the extent practical. Good training 
on ´Routine Accident Management` remains, of course, a basic need. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
A Site Disruptive Accident / Extreme Event calls for a large series of actions, which are the 
subject of an extensive set of procedures and guidelines, and which may require in many cases mobile 
/ portable equipment, stored both on-site and off-site. Still actions may be required beyond the 
documented set of procedures and guidelines, and these then may require from the ERO an innovative 
approach. This can only be achieved by a highly skilful ERO which has gone through much in-depth 
training. 
A prime action is to restore command and control, should these have been lost. Then actions 
must be initiated to stabilise the plant, which include shutting down and removing decay heat as well 
                                                 
6 See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision-making 




as providing containment. As the event likely has damaged the on-site and off-site power systems, 
many actions are planned to be locally and manually, where needed with portable batteries, 
emergency lightning, protective clothing, etc. Apart from the initial actions to stabilise the plant, 
measures must be taken to provide for needed resources such as cooling water, mobile pumps, mobile 
power sources, diesel fuel, etc. 
The associated assembly of procedures and guidelines are often called ´Extensive Damage 
Mitigation Guidelines, (EDMG)`. They were first introduced in the US to offer protection against 
terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants, in the wake of the 9/11 events. In other countries, the 
approach for site disruptive accidents - if available at all - is not so well documented in the public 
domain, which prevents proper discussion in a public document as this one is. Together with the 
execution of the EDMG (or equivalent), the Emergency Response Organisation must take measures 
to regain control over the site (if lost), limit site damage (fire fighting, etc.), take care of wounded 
people, provide provisions for lodging and food for plant staff, provide communication for family of 
staff and initiate the Emergency Plan. 
As widespread site damage must be assumed, as well as damage off-site may have occurred, a 
systematic use of portable /mobile equipment is essential to mitigate the consequences. Counter 
measures will first try to make best use of surviving plant equipment, but are augmented by equipment 
stored on-site and off-site. Notably the long term provisions must be provided from off-site sources. 
The off-site organisation must be well established, its equipment well maintained and regularly 
inspected and tested. Examples of such methods are the FLEX approach in the US, the use of EME 
in Canada and the use of the Rapid Response Force (´FARN`) in France. 
The total set of procedures and guidelines plus needed equipment and organisational provisions 
should be regularly inspected and tested. 
6 ABBREVIATIONS 
AC Alternate Current (power) 
AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure(s) 
ARP Alarm Response Procedure(s) 
ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram 
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident 
CST Condensate Storage Tank 
DBA Design Basis Accident 
DC Direct Current (power; usually meaning batteries) 
DEC Design Extension Condition 
EDMG Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline(s) 
EE Extreme Events 
ELAP Extended Loss of AC Power 
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure 
ERO Emergency Response Organization 
FLEX Flexible and diverse response (includes use of portable equipment) 
FSG FLEX Support Guideline(s) 
LUHS Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink 
SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidance / Guideline(s) 
SBO Station Black Out 
SDA Site Disruptive Accident 
SRO Senior Reactor Operator 
TSC Technical Support Centre 
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